Arnett v. State: Length of Hospitalization Admissible as Tending to Prove an Intent to Kill by Cox, Robert F., Jr.
Volume 74 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74, 
1969-1970 
1-1-1970 
Arnett v. State: Length of Hospitalization Admissible as Tending 
to Prove an Intent to Kill 
Robert F. Cox Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Robert F. Cox Jr., Arnett v. State: Length of Hospitalization Admissible as Tending to Prove an Intent to 
Kill, 74 DICK. L. REV. 318 (1970). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
ARNETT v. STATE: LENGTH OF
HOSPITALIZATION ADMISSIBLE AS
TENDING TO PROVE AN INTENT TO KILL
In Arnett v. State,' the Indiana Supreme Court held that evi-
dence of the victim's length of hospitalization was admissible for
jury consideration when the defendant was charged with assault
and battery with intent to kill. The majority relied on an analogy
between the length of hospitalization and case law on nature and
extent of injuries and on an analogy between length of hospitaliza-
tion and prognosis 2 or future condition. Judge Hunter, in dissent,
felt the evidence could involve too many factors unrelated to the
intent element to be admissible. This decision extends the law
of admissibility of evidence of nature and extent of injury and of
prognosis or future condition as tending to prove intent to kill by
admitting evidence of length of hospitalization as relevant to in-
tent. The purpose of this Note is to analyze Arnett in light of the
law of admissibility of evidence to show an intent to kill. The
analysis will focus on four areas: the general rule of relevancy,
and its more particular rules concerning nature and extent of in-
juries, prognosis or future condition, and length of hospitalization.
The Note will then comment on the validity of the Arnett decision
in light of the four areas examined.
Arnett v. State arose out of a bar fight between the defendant
and Eldrid Bryant in which Bryant was beaten and shot. The
trial court found the defendant guilty of assault and battery with
intent to kill. During the trial, the victim was permitted to testify,
over the objection of the defendant, as to the length of time he
spent in various hospitals. The defendant appealed contending
that the lower court committed reversible error by allowing the
testimony as to length of hospitalization. The defendant reasoned
that the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of intent, prejudicial
to the rights of an accused to a fair trial, and its admission abusive
of the trial court's discretion.
1. 244 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1969).
2. Prognosis: "A prediction of the duration, course, and termina-
tion of a disease, based on all information available in the individual case
and knowledge of how the disease behaves generally." BLAKSTON's NEW
GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 968 (2d ed. 1956).
3. Judge Jackson wrote an opinion concurring with the result of




The general rule of relevancy is that only evidence which is
relevant is admissible and relevant evidence is always admissible
unless prohibited by some specific rule.4 One of the questions
raised in the application of this general rule is whether the degree
of persuasiveness of a relevant fact should determine admissibility.
Many courts have received or discarded evidence on the basis of its
strength in producing its desired result.5
The Indiana view, implicit in the Arnett decision, was estab-
lished in Deal v. State.6 The prosecution, in a murder trial, intro-
duced testimony by a witness that he heard a man, who sounded
like the defendant, say he shot a woman in the arm and killed a
man. The evidence was held admissible as tending to prove it was
the defendant who shot the deceased, when it had already been
established that the wife of the deceased had been shot in the arm.7
The court stated that, since the evidence slightly tended to prove
defendant's guilt, it should be admissible.8 There are two basic
4. This principle, then, does not mean that anything that has
probative value is admissible; this would be an entire miscon-
ception. The true meaning is that everything having a probative
value is "ipso facto" entitled to be assumed to be admissible, and
that therefore any rule of policy which may be valid to exclude it
is a superadded and abnormal rule. . . . [T]hese rules of policy
appear as merely so many reserved spaces in the vast territory of
logically probative material.
1 J. WIGMOIE, EVIDENCE § 10 at 293-94 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Cases holding evidence admissible if it tends, even though
slightly, to prove the issue: Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150 (1892);
People v. Kafoury, 16 Cal. App. 718, 117 P. 938 (1911); Wilson v. State,
247 Ind. 680, 221 N.E.2d 347 (1966); Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E.
1076 (1907); Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N.E. 930 (1895); Stevenson v.
Stewart, 11 Pa. 307 (1849). Cases holding evidence admissible if it makes
a reasonable inference: Levinson v. State, 54 Ala. 520 (1875); Lange
Cable Tool D. Co. v. Barnett Petroleum Corp., 142 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940). Cases requiring the inference to be supported by a pre-
ponderance of weight or probability: People v. Jeffers, 372 Ill. 590, 25
N.E.2d 35 (1940); Standafer v. First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 236 Minn.
123, 52 N.W.2d 718 (1952); Cohn v. Saidal, 71 N.H. 558, 53 A. 800 (1902).
6. 140 Ind. 354, 39 N.E. 930 (1895); accord, Wilson v. State, 247
Ind. 680, 221 N.E.2d 347 (1966) (photographs of a homicide victim lying
in a pool of blood and blood-stained clothing admissible where the jury
had a choice of first or second degree murder); Durst v. State, 190 Ind.
133, 128 N.E. 920 (1920); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Starks, 58 Ind.
App. 341, 106 N.E. 646 (1914); McIntosh v. State, 151 Ind. 251, 51 N.E.
354 (1898); Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307 (1849) (where the defendant
contended his signature and the note were forged in an action on a debt,
evidence was admissible that the defendant had borrowed money from
someone other than the plaintiff before and after the date on the note).
7. Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N.E. 930 (1895).
8. Id. at 372, 39 N.E. at 935.
reasons for the view that evidence should be admitted if it even
slightly tends to settle a litigated issue. The first reason focuses
on the quantity of evidence that a party should be required to pro-
duce in support of his contention on an issue. The position is that
the determination of a contested fact or the establishment of a
necessary inference should not hinge on one proven fact but that
the conclusion should be corroborated by any and all information
which could possibly be construed as relating to itY The second
argument behind the view permitting the admissibility of evidence
even slightly bearing upon a litigated issue is that the conclusive-
ness of any evidence goes to its weight and not to its admissbility:' °
... [T]he convincing power of the inference is for the
jury, when weighing the value of the fact proved; not
for the judge, in determining the bare question of its rele-
vancy. It is sufficient for the purposes of his inquiry,
that it has some affinity with the principal inquiry,
though this may be weak or remote.1'
Another line of cases concludes that evidence which does not
relate to the contested issue with a reasonable preponderance of
weight is inadmissible.1 2 In Cohn v. Saidal,'3 the plaintiff brought
an action for malicious prosecution against a group of men he be-
lieved were attempting to injure his tailoring business. The plain-
tiff had the burden of proving malice on the part of the defend-
ants, which meant showing they had no reasonable grounds for a
cause of action against him. To support his burden, the plaintiff
introduced evidence that the defendants filed motions for a volun-
tary non-suit. The plaintiff's contention was that from the volun-
tary non-suit the inference could be drawn that the defendants
knew they had no reasonable grounds for a cause of action against
the plaintiff and that the defendant's prosecution was, therefore,
malicious. The lower court refused to allow the evidence and, in
affirming, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held:
The probative bearing of the evidence upon the point in
issue is not logically clear and plain, but doubtful and in-
volved, leading to no certain result. Such a mode of ar-
riving at a conclusion of fact is generally, if not univer-
sally, inadmissible. No inference of fact or law is reli-
able drawn from premises which are uncertain. When-
ever circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact,
the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
presumed..
4
The general requirement of relevancy is at the center of the
law of admissibility of evidence. From the practical problems of
determining whether evidence is relevant, courts have decided that
9. Id. at 373, 39 N.E. at 936.
10. Id.
11. Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307, 310 (1849).
12. See cases cited note 5 supra.
13. 71 N.H. 558, 53 A. 800 (1902).
14. Id. at 568, 53 A. at 805.
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it is the degree of persuasion of the relevant fact which determines
either the admissibility of evidence or the weight which a jury will
place on it. Nature and extent of injuries, prognosis or future con-
dition and length of hospitalization will now be analyzed to deter-
mine if they are relevant in some degree of persuasion to an issue
of intent to kill.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF INJURY EVIDENCE
A vast majority of the courts have held that evidence showing
the nature and extent of the victim's injuries is admissible as
tending to prove an intent to kill. 15  In Claypooie v. Common-
wealth,16 the defendant was charged with malicious shooting at
and wounding another with intent to kill when he shot the victim
in the leg. During the trial, the attending physician testified,
among other things,1 7 as to nature and extent of the wound. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that
the admission of this testimony was reversible error. The court
recognized that evidence concerning the nature and extent of in-
jury was admissible as relevant to intent to kill.18 Other examples
15. See cases cited notes 16, 19-23, 25 infra.
16. 337 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1960).
17. Attending physician also testified as to prognosis of victim's
future condition and inability to perform manual labor. Claypoole went
on to hold the lower court committed reversible error in allowing the
evidence of prognosis. This part of the decision will be discussed at text
accompanying note 47 infra.
18. 337 S.W.2d at 32; accord, People v. Lathrop, 49 Cal. App. 63, 192
P. 722 (1920), which held testimony by the victim that he had not been able
to work for a month and a half and that the shotgun wound to the leg
bothered him at time of trial was admissible when defendant was charged
with assault with intent to commit murder; Harmon v. State, 48 Fla. 44, 37
So. 520 (1904), which held testimony that victim suffered great pain from
knife wound admissible when defendant was charged with assault with
intent to murder; King v. State, 21 Ga. 220 (1857), which held:
The extent of the wound and the nature of it, inflicted on the
person on whom the assault was made, when there was one, is
always involved in the issue. It has much to do with proving the
intent of the assailant.
Id. at 225; Williams v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 580, 17 S.W.2d 706 (1929),
which held the exhibition of the victim's blood-stained clothes and the
victim's showing his wound to the jury were admissible when the de-
fendant was charged with malicious shooting and wounding with intent to
kill; Murphy v. State, 43 Neb. 34, 61 N.W. 491 (1894), which held testi-
mony by the victim that his general health had deteriorated and that he
was still not able to work as of the tine of the trial admissible when the
defendant was charged with assault with intent to inflict great bodily in-
jury; State v. Owens, 224 S.C. 533, 80 S.E.2d 113 (1954), which held testi-
mony by the victim, a convict, as to the nature and extent of the injuries
to his back and legs and the medical and surgical attention to them ad-
of evidence of nature and extent of injury admissible to show intent
include prolonged disability as a result of the wound,19 location of
the wound or the path of the bullet,20 the permanency of the
wound, 21 and the duration of recovery or confinement to bed.
22
Courts which hold that evidence of the nature and extent of
injuries is admissible as relevant to an intent to kill justify their
holdings on two basic premises. First, it is reasoned that the nature
of a wound is to be distinguished from its extent.23 For example,
an assaulter may deliberately crush a person's hands, stab him in
the arm, and break one of his legs and thereby inflict extensive
injuries on his victim but still never intend to kill him. On the
other hand, a person may stab his victim in the chest, intending to
kill him, and accidentally miss any vital areas, and thereby inflict
only slight injury which requires little treatment. The significance
is not the extent of the wound itself but the nature of its serious-
ness which reflects intent. Therefore, since courts speak in terms
of nature and extent of injury, they seem to imply that evidence
missible when the defendant, a chain gang guard, wounded the victim
with a shotgun and was charged with assault and battery with intent to
kill and murder.
19. Damron v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1958), which
held the victim's testimony that he had limited use of his hand because of
the wound was admissible when the defendant was charged with mali-
ciously striking and wounding with a knife, a deadly weapon, with intent
to kill; Roberts v. State, 4 Md. App. 209, 241 A.2d 903 (1968), which held
the victim's testimony that his right arm and leg were paralyzed was ad-
missible when defendant shot victim in back of the head with a .22 calibre
rifle and was charged with assault and battery with intent to kill.
20. Burton v. State, 37 Ala. App. 396, 69 So. 2d 477 (1954), which held
attending physician's testimony as to the victim's shotgun wounds to his
back was admissible when the defendant was charged with assault with
intent to murder; People v. Kafoury, 16 Cal. App. 718, 117 P. 938 (1911),
which held the victim's testimony that the first of three shots from the
defendant broke her hip and that he choked her into unconsciousness was
admissible when the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon, with intent to commit murder.
21. People v. Manning, 320 Ill. App. 143, 50 N.E.2d 118 (1943). The
defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. He had hit the
victim on the head with a truck crank handle when the victim blocked
the defendant's beer delivery truck in an alley. Medical testimony of the
extent of the victim's injuries and the degree of their permanency was
held admissible to show the weapon was dangerous and the nature of the
assault.
22. Bailey v. State, 24 Ala. App. 339, 135 So. 407 (1931), which held
testimony that the victim was confined to bed after the defendants took
the victim outside of town and beat him up was admissible when the
defendants were charged with assault to murder but convicted of assault
and battery; Jackson v. State, 19 Ala. App. 339, 97 So. 260 (1923), which
held that the victim's testimony that it was about 10 days before he
could leave the house was admissible in an assault to murder trial; People
v. Zounek, 10 N.Y. Crim. 251, 20 N.Y.S. 755 (Sup. Ct. 1892), which held
the victim's testimony that the blow from a piece of steel knocked him
unconscious for a length of time was admissible in a trial of assault with a
deadly weapon and with intent to kill.
23. See Harmon v. State, 48 Fla. 44, 37 So. 520 (1904); King v. State,
21 Ga. 220 (1857); State v. Remington, 50 Or. 99, 91 P. 473 (1907).
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of extent is inadmissible unless shown to be related to the nature
of the injury.
The second premise behind the admission of nature and extent
of injury evidence is that when no evidence is available which
directly reveals a person's mental intent, such as the defendant's
own confession or the admission of a conversation in which the
defendant related his intent to someone else, evidence of an out-
ward manifestation of the alleged intent will serve to prove in-
tent:
2 4
No better evidence could be adduced, we think, as to the
intent of the defendant to kill at the time he fired the shot,
than it entered a vital part, and its serious consequen-
ces. . . . It cannot be doubted but that the serious
wounding of [the victim] in a vital part was some stronger
evidence of defendant's intent to kill him than if he had
wounded him but slightly, in some part not vital. From
this wounding, in the absence of countervailing tesimony
or circumstances, the law will presume an intent to kill,
and this evidence only tended to show what the law pre-
sumes.
25
Using these two premises as the foundation, most courts have held
that evidence as to nature and extent of injuries is relevant to
an intent to kill.
Some cases have found that certain evidence of the nature and
extent of injuries was erroneously admitted but not sufficiently
prejudicial to the defendant to constitute reversible error. Police
officer's testimony of the nature of his wound and the operation
necessary to remove the bullet was "erroneously offered" but, in
light of the evidence and the fact that the defendant was sentenced
to life imprisonment instead of death, it was not "substantially
prejudicial." 26 In Meredith v. State,27 the Supreme Court of In-
diana decided photographs of the escape car, the pistol, and the
dead victim were admissible in a murder trial. The majority in
24. See cases cited notes 16, 19-23 supra, note 25 infra.
25. State v. Grant, 144 Mo. 56, 63, 45 S.W. 1102, 1103 (1898), rev'd on
other grounds, State v. Blitz, 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027 (1903).
26. People v. Sustak, 15 111. 2d 115, 125, 153 N.E.2d 849, 855 (1958).
The defendant was indicted for murder when he wounded a police officer
who was chasing him after he had shot and killed another man. For the
proposition that relevant evidence will not be excluded merely because it is
prejudicial, see People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1960); People v. Ford, 175 Cal. App. 2d 109, 345 P.2d 573 (1959); Brooks
v. State, 69 Ga. App. 697, 26 S.E.2d 549 (1943); State v. Remington, 50
Or. 99, 91 P. 473 (1907); State v. Owens, 224 S.C. 533, 80 S.E.2d 113 (1954);
Langley v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 254, 86 S.W.2d 755 (1935).
27. 247 Ind. 233, 214 N.E.2d 385 (1966).
Meredith felt the evidence may be prejudicial but that the "jury
is entitled to all the details, '"28 while the dissent believed the con-
stant repetition of the evidence inflamed the minds of the jurors
and did not relate to the elements of the crime charged.
2 9
Other cases have held evidence as to nature and extent of in-
jury inadmissible.3 0 The leading cases in support of the minority
view are People v. Carter;" and People v. Nicholopoulos.3 2 In Car-
ter, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the attending
physician told the victim that if she stayed at the hospital she
would have only a small scar but that if she left they would guar-
antee nothing. After the victim left the hospital, she lost the use
of her eye and later had to have it removed. The defendant con-
tended the evidence indicated that the effect of the injury resulted
from the victim's failure to provide for herself, rather than from
the injury itself. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the defend-
ant's contention but refused to admit the evidence of the serious-
ness of the injury, holding that "specific intent . . . is found, not
from the nature or seriousness of the injury inflicted, but from
the proof of the reckless character and manner of the as-
sault. . . ."23 The Nicholopouios court relied upon Carter to hold
that a police officer's testimony of blood on the floor, the victim's
shirt, and the stretcher, and of the condition of the victim when he
was in the hospital was inadmissible
14
Case law appears to support the rule that evidence of the na-
ture and extent of injury should be admitted as tending to prove
intent. Those courts holding against admitting such evidence, like
Carter and Nicholopoulos, have been limited, as shown by the num-
ber of cases distinguishing them,3 5 to their particular fact situations.
28. Id. at 238, 214 N.E.2d at 388.
29. Id. (dissenting opinion).
30. People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960)
(opinion by witness of powder burn on victim's shirt inadmissible); People
v. Carter, 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312 (1951); Napier v. State, 225 Ky. 384,
9 S.W.2d 107 (1928) (gory details of death, such as photograph of facial
expression of a victim as she died, inadmissible in a murder trial).
31. 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312 (1951).
32. 25 Ill. App. 2d 451, 185 N.E.2d 209 (1962). The defendant was
charged with assault with intent to murder. The defendant entered the
victim's restaurant, smelling of alcohol and staggering, and proceeded to
enter into an argument with the victim which led to his shooting. The
question before the jury was whether the defendant could be convicted of
assault with intent to murder, or whether, because of his intoxication, he
had no intent to kill. For testimony in controversy and holding, see text
accompanying note 34 infra.
33. 410 Ill. at 467, 102 N.E.2d at 314 (1951).
34. 25 Ill. App. 2d 451, 185 N.E.2d 209 (1962).
35. In People v. Radford, 87 Ill. App. 2d 308, 232 N.E.2d 100 (1967),
the defendants were charged with theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
Three of the defendants allegedly schemed to break an arm of one of the
defendants, push him in front of a car and then collect personal injury
damages. The defendant, Radford,. appealed contending error when the
lower court permitted the defendant, Thomas, to display the scar which he
Notes
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Also, both Carter and Nicholopoulos involved evidence which em-
phasized the extent of the victim's injuries, and evidence of extent
of the injuries, unlike their nature, does not necessarily reflect an
intent to kill. Moreover, the Carter court indicated that the intent
of the defendant could have been established by more concrete
facts relating the extent of the victim's injury to its nature.
8 6
PROGNOSIS OR FUTURE CONDITION EVIDENCE
A split of authority exists concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence of prognosis or future condition of the victim as tending
to prove intent. Cases which hold prognosis admissible as tending
to prove intent justify their decisions on three grounds: the evi-
dence in question is relevant to the issue of intent, 37 the reception
testified came from the broken arm. In affirming the lower court, the
Illinois Court of Appeals distinguished Nicholopoulos saying that there
the prosecution emphasized the gory details. In People v. Doyle, 76 Ill.
App. 2d 302, 222 N.E.2d 205 (1966), the defendant was indicted with at-
tempted murder and aggravated battery. The police had chased the de-
fendant and two others in a Chicago alley and the defendant had shot one
of the policemen in the stomach with a shotgun. The defendant was
convicted of attempted murder. On appeal, the court held evidence of the
policeman's injuries admissible and distinguished Nicholopoulos by saying
that case involved assault with intent to murder, while in the instant
case the trial court had no way of knowing upon which charge the
jury would act. People v. Franklin, 74 Ill. App. 2d 392, 220 N.E.2d
872 (1966), involving a conviction of aggravated battery after the de-
fendant stabbed the victim thirteen times. The defendant pleaded self-
defense. In holding evidence of the victim's injuries admissible, the
court distinguished Nicholopoulos by saying that case involved a plea
of intoxicated inability to form an intent to murder but that the in-
stant case involved a plea of self-defense. In People v. Cunningham,
73 Ill. App. 2d 357, 218 N.E.2d 827 (1966), the defendant was convicted
of attempt to murder after he was drinking at a tavern and shot a number
of people at the bar. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the
lower court erred in admitting evidence of the extent of injury to the per-
son mentioned and to others not mentioned in the indictment. The court
held the evidence as to the nature and extent of the injuries to the person
mentioned in the indictment admissible but that the other was not. It
distinguished Nicholopoulos because the prosecution emphasized the grue-
some nature of the injuries, while in the instant case it had not. People v.
Tilden, 50 Ill. App. 2d 354, 200 N.E.2d 33 (1964), involved a murder con-
viction. The defendant contended on appeal that articles of clothing worn
by the uncle of the victim on the night of the shooting, although not
admitted into evidence, were improperly displayed to the jury. The trial
court allowed the display because the uncle too, was shot in the chest during
the fight which killed his niece. The defendant cited Nicholopoulos for
support but the court distinguished the case, saying the display in the
present case was relevant to questions of who fired the gun and whether
there was malice, while in Nicholopoulos the question was whether the
defendant was too intoxicated to have an intent to murder.
36. 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312 (1951).
37. People v. Manning, 320 Ill. App. 143, 50 N.E.2d 118 (1943) (med-
of such evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court,3" and
the jury needs this evidence as a "yardstick" for fixing punish-
ment.3 9 In Gayer v. State,40 the leading Indiana case on prognosis
evidence, the defendant was charged with assault and battery after
allegedly beating an old man in a tavern. He was convicted and
appealed on the grounds that the lower court erred in admitting
the attending physician's testimony that the victim may never im-
prove satisfactorily enough to care for himself. The Indiana Su-
preme Court held that the evidence was admissible for jury con-
sideration on whether the defendant's acts were done in a rude,
insolent and angry manner, as required by statute.41 The majority
recognized a split of authority, citing Claypoole v. Commonwealth4 2
and Commonwealth v. D'Agostino4g for the opposing views, and
ical testimony as to extent of injuries and degree of permanency of effects);
Graves v. State, 439 P.2d 476 (Nev.), .cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968)
(physician's testimony as to permanency); Griffith v. State, 142 Tex. Crim.
304, 152 S.W.2d 349 (1941) (physician's testimony that victim had per-
manent paralysis from waist down). When ruling the evidence relevant,
some cases use res gestae to refer to relevancy. See, e.g., Phillips v. State,
161 Ala. 60, 49 So. 794 (1909); Bailey v. State, 24 Ala. App. 339, 135 So. 407
(1931); Jackson v. State, 19 Ala. App. 339, 97 So. 260 (1923); People v.
Zounek, 10 N.Y. Crim. 251, 20 N.Y.S. 755 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Root v. State,
169 Tex. Crim. 382, 334 S.W.2d 154 (1960). For a discussion of res gestae
and relevancy, see Bornhouser, Res Gestae: A Synonym for Confusion, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 229 (1968).
38. E.g., Adams v. State, 33 Ala. App. 136, 31 So. 2d 99, cert. denied,
249 Ala. 294, 31 So. 2d 105 (1947); People v. Lathrop, 49 Cal. App. 63, 192
P. 722 (1920); People v. Ciucci, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40, U.S. reh. denied,
357 U.S. 924 (1956); Meredith v. State, 247 Ind. 233, 214 N.E.2d 385 (1966);
Loveless v. State, 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864 (1960); Hergenrother v.
State, 215 Ind. 89, 18 N.E.2d 784 (1939); Murphy v. State, 43 Neb. 34, 61
N.W. 491 (1894).
39. Gambrell v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 620, 139 S.W.2d 454 (1940).
Two defendants were convicted of malicious wounding after one of them
shot the victim. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
admission of the physician's testimony as to the future effects of the vic-
tim's injuries on the grounds that it was proper for the jury to consider
in fixing the punishment. But cf. Claypoole v. Commonwealth, 337
S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1960), discussed at text accompanying note 47, infra,
which excluded such testimony but did not overrule or distinguish Gain-
brell.
40. 247 Ind. 113, 210 N.E.2d 852 (1965); accord, People v. Manning,
320 Ill. App. 143, 50 N.E.2d 118 (1943); Murphy v. State, 43 Neb. 34, 61
N.W. 491 (1894); Griffith v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 304, 152 S.W.2d 349
(1941); Jowell v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 328, 71 S.W. 286 (1902).
41. IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-403 (1956 Replacement).
42. 337 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1960).
43. 344 Mass. 249, 182 N.E.2d 133, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 852 (1962).
The defendant was charged with assault and battery "'by means of a cer-
tain dangerous weapon, to wit: a sharp instrument, a more particular
description of which is ... unknown.'" Id. at 250. Evidence was admitted,
over the defendant's objection, which included photographs of the lacera-
tions, doctor's testimony that the scars would be permanent, and testimony
about the presence of blood on the victim's clothes. The evidence con-
cerning the future physical condition of the victim was held admissible to
determine whether the injury was inflicted by a sharp instrument. Ac-
cord, Horowitz v. Bokron, 337 Mass. 739, 151 N.E.2d 480 (1958); Graves v.
State, 439 P.2d 476 (Nev.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968).
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chose to side with D'Agostino which held that the trial court had
discretionary powers on the admissibility of such evidence.
On the other hand, cases holding prognosis evidence inadmis-
sible say the court abused its discretion, 44 the evidence was preju-
dicial to the rights of a fair trial,45 and the evidence did not relate
to the issue of intent.46 It appears from the decisions denying the
admissibility of prognosis evidence that the questions as to rele-
vancy, prejudice, and abuse of discretion could be overcome only
if the prognosis or future condition were directly related to the
nature and extent of the victim's injuries. In Claypoole v. Com-
monwealth,47 for example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recog-
nized the general rule of admissibility of evidence of nature and
extent of injury but refused to admit a prognosis that the victim
may not be able to do any manual labor.48 Hypothetical questions
concerning what results might be expected from the type of injury
the victim suffered have also been held inadmissible, 49 as have
opinions as to the victim's future pain and suffering.50
The divergence of authority on the question of the admissibility
of prognosis evidence to prove an intent to kill stems from the
difference in opinion as to what medical facts can comprise a
prognosis. Those courts admitting prognosis evidence would follow
the conclusion that a pessimistic prognosis reflects the serious na-
ture and extent of the original injury,51 from which the jury could
infer an intent to kill. On the other hand, those courts excluding
the evidence would feel that prognosis may reflect extent but
44. State v. Redfield, 73 Iowa 643, 35 N.W. 673 (1887). The de-
fendant was convicted of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury.
The victim testified as to the nature and extent of his injuries, then the
State called a physician to get testimony as to what results might be ex-
pected from the kind of blow the defendant gave the victim. The objec-
tions of the defendant to the answers, which were to the effect that a brain
concussion and future impairment could have resulted, were upheld on
appeal.
45. E.g., Phillips v. State, 161 Ala. 221, 49 So. 794 (1909); Allen v.
State, 149 Tex. Cr. App. 612, 197 S.W.2d 1013 (1946); Fowler v. State, 171
Tex. Crim. 600, 352 S.W.2d 838 (1962); Reynolds v. State, 372 S.W.2d 540
(Tex. Crim. 1963).
46. Cases cited note 45 supra.
47. 337 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1960).
48 Id.
49. State v. Redfield, 73 Iowa 643, 35 N.W. 673 (1887).
50. Fowler v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 600, 352 S.W.2d 838 (1962) (phy-
sician testified that the victim would have a shortened leg and a per-
manent limp); Reynolds v. State, 372 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Crim. 1963) (phy-
sician's testimony as to the "'final diagnosis'" fell within Fowler rule on
pain and suffering).
51. See cases cited notes 37-40 supra.
does not necessarily reflect the nature of the injury and no infer-
ence of an intent to kill should arise.52 A victim, it is reasoned,
could have permanent disability from injuries which may have
been extensive but which, by their nature, show no intent to kill.
LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION EVIDENCE
When shown to be a direct result of the victim's injuries,
courts generally hold evidence of length of hospitalization admis-
sible as tending to prove intent.53 In Gilmer v. State,5 4 an assault
with intent to kill case, the defendant had shot the victim in the
back, severing his spinal cord and paralyzing him. The victim
was permitted to testify that he was moved from one hospital to
another. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
reasoning that the testimony was relevant because the defendant
was charged with assault with intent to kill, and the testimony was
introduced for the specific purpose of showing the nature and
extent of his injuries which, in turn, show intent. Other examples
of evidence of length of hospitalization admissible as tending to
prove an intent to kill are: testimony by the victim that he was
confined for two and a half months as a result of being knifed by
defendant, 55 the attending physician's testimony as to the length
of the victim's hospitalization after being stabbed a number of
times,56 and the victim's testimony that he was in the hospital two
weeks subsequent to being shot in the head and that his right arm
and leg were paralyzed causing him to miss school for two and a
half months.
5 7
52. See cases cited notes 44-50 supra.
53. Wright v. State, 148 Ala. 596, 42 So. 745 (1907). The attend-
ing physician testified that he sutured the victim's lacerations, that the
victim had lost quite a lot of blood and that the length of hospitalization
was a result of the wounds. Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 268
(1904). The victim testified he was confined two and one-half months as
a result of being knifed by the defendant. Shanks v. State, 80 Ga. App.
759, 57 S.E.2d 357 (1950). The attending physician testified as to the na-
ture of the victim's injury, that the victim was rendered unconscious and
was immediately taken to the hospital where he remained for two weeks,
and that the victim still had to go (six months after receiving the wound)
for treatment of one of the wounds. Claypoole v. Commonwealth, 355 S.W.
2d 652 (Ky. 1962) (the appeal following re-trial of appeal in 337 S.W.2d
30 (Ky. 1960)). The physician's testimony that the victim's injuries
could have caused death and the victim's testimony that he was in the
hospital 482 days as a result of the wound were held admissible. Williams
v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 580, 17 S.W.2d 706 (1929). The victim's testi-
mony that he was carried to the hospital with a chest wound, X-rayed,
and treated for eight days was held admissible in a trial for malicious
shooting with intent to kill. Roberts v. State, 4 Md. App. 209, 241 A.2d
903 (1968). The victim's testimony that he was in the hospital two weeks
as a result of his head wound was held admissible.
54. 157 Tex. Crim. 109, 246 S.W.2d 639 (1952).
55. Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 268 (1904).
56. Wright v. State, 148, Ala. 596, 42 So. 745 (1907).
57. Roberts v. State, 4 Md. App. 209, 241 A.2d 903 (1968).
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On the other hand, in Phillips v. State,58 the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that a physician's testimony that he took the victim
to Atlanta for treatment was inadmissible in a trial for assault with
intent to kill. The testimony, said the court, "had a tendency to
excite sympathy for [the victim] and prejudice against the defend-
ant, and was likely to be misused and overestimated by the jury
... [and] had no tendency to prove any circumstances of the
shooting."59 It appears, however, that Phillips represents a singu-
lar minority view, for all other cases in which the change in hos-
pitals was shown to be a direct result of the nature and extent
of the victim's injuries have allowed the admission of evidence
concerning the change.
ARNETT V. STATE IN LIGHT OF THE FOUR AREAS
1. General Rule of Relevancy
In applying the general rule that evidence must be relevant to
be admissible, many courts have established requirements of ad-
mission based on degree of persuasion.A0 Yet, the Arnett court
leaves open the question whether the degree of persuasiveness of
the evidence is to determine its admissibility. When it accepted
the testimony by Bryant as to the length of his hospitalization, the
Indiana court said:
Since the evidence of the victim's hospital confinement
was relevant to an issue in the case and since there was
testimony presented that the wounds inflicted upon the
witness were very severe, it was well within the discre-
tion of the trial judge to overrule Appellant's objection
and admit the testimony61
It is submitted that the Arnett court should have discussed the
length of hospitalization evidence in terms of its degree of per-
suasion and that it should have adopted a restrictive rule in line
with Cohn v. Saidal.
6 2
The issue in Cohn is similar to that in Arnett. In Cohn, the
evidence of voluntary non-suit was introduced to have the jury
infer the defendants had no reasonable grounds for a cause of ac-
tion in their prosecution, in the other suit, against the present
plaintiff. From that inference, the jury could further infer that
58. 161 Ala. 60, 49 So. 794 (1909).
59. Id. at 65, 49 So. at 796.
60. See notes 4-14 and accompanying text supra.
61. 244 N.E.2d at 914 (Ind. 1969) (emphasis added).
62. 71 N.H. 558, 53 A. 800 (1902). See notes 12-14 and accompanying
text supra.
the defendants were guilty of the crime charged, malicious prose-
cution. However, other inferences, perhaps more logical, could be
made from the non-suit, such as a good faith belief by the defend-
ants that they did not have grounds for a cause of action. This
inference of course, would not indicate malicious intent and the
court accordingly, refused the admission of the evidence. Likewise,
in Arnett, the length of hospitalization evidence was introduced
to have the jury infer that the victim suffered injuries of a nature
which would indicate intent to kill. Since the length of a victim's
hospitalization depends on many factors, however, this inference
is just one of many that can be derived from such evidence.
Length of hospitalization can be controlled by the quality of medi-
cal care furnished the victim, the development of non-related com-
plications or illnesses, the victim's attitude toward recovery, or
the doctor-patient ratio in the hospital. None of these inferences
indicate an intent to kill. The result, then, is that the jury's deci-
sion on the issue of the intent of the accused may depend upon the
acceptance of one of several equally valid inferences. In fact situ-
ations like Cohn and Arnett, if the jury chooses the inference the
evidence is introduced to produce, the requisite state of mind is
"proven" and the defendant's case is lost. If one of the other possi-
ble inferences is allowed, however, the opposite can result.
The Arnett court felt justified in admitting the length of hos-
pitalization testimony merely because it "was relevant to an issue
in the case." 63  The State introduced the length of hospitalization
testimony intending to produce an inference of guilt. When the
Arnett court admitted the testimony, it dismissed the fact that the
length of hospitalization testimony could also have produced an
inference of innocence. To avoid denying a "beyond reasonable
doubt" fair trial, it is submitted that the Arnett court should have
adopted a restrictive rule: when evidence produces equal infer-
ences for and against the existence of criminal intent, that evidence
should be excluded before it reaches the jury, unless the intended
inference can be substantiated by more convincing facts.
2. Nature and Extent of Injuries
The existence of Arnett's criminal intent may be inferred from
the nature and extent of Bryant's injuries. This rule is well-estab-
lished by case law.64 In relying on nature and extent of injury
case law for its decision, the Arnett court used what seems to be
valid support; however, the question left unanswered by use of
nature and extent of injury case law is whether length of hospital-
ization actually tends to prove an intent to kill. Nature and extent
of injury helps to show intent but this premise does not necessarily
mean that the length of hospitalization reflects the nature and ex-
63. 244 N.E.2d at 914 (Ind. 1969).
64. See notes 15-36 and accompanying text supra.
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tent of injury. Since length of hospitalization may depend on fac-
tors other than the nature and extent of the victim's injuries,6
it is submitted that length of hospitalization should be admitted
only if the proponent of the evidence can show that hospitalization
was caused by the nature and extent of the victim's injuries and
not by other factors unrelated to the injury.
3. Prognosis or Future Condition
Unlike the law on the admissibility of nature and extent of in-
jury, the law admitting prognosis, relied on by Arnett for support
of its decision to admit evidence of length of hospitalization, is not
well-established. 66 The issue raised by Gayer v. State6 7 and Clay-
poole v. Commonwealth, 8 both cited by the majority in Arnett,
is whether the conclusion that the victim may suffer future dis-
ability actually shows the nature and extent of the injuries, which,
in turn, tends to prove an intent to kill on the part of the defend-
ant.6 19 Even if the Gayer view, which admitted prognosis evidence,
is the more acceptable, there does not seem to be a sufficient rela-
tionship between length of hospitalization and prognosis or future
condition. Gayer held that prognosis or future condition was rele-
vant to an intent to kill because prognosis reflected the nature and
extent of a person's injuries. But, as mentioned earlier,70 length
of hospitalization involves many factors other than the nature and
extent of injury.
The Arnett court is now asking the jury to extend its reasoning
one step further than its comparison of length of hospitalization
to nature and extent of injury. The court rules that length of
hospitalization may indicate a pessimistic prognosis or future con-
dition which, in turn, shows the nature and extent of the victim's
injuries and, therefore, an intent to kill on the part of the defend-
ant. It is submitted that length of hospitalization is analogous to
prognosis or future condition only when both are directly related
to the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. Therefore, unless
this direct relationship is shown to exist, neither prognosis nor
length of hospitalization should be admitted as tending to prove
an intent to kill.
65. For possible factors involved in length of hospitalization, see p. 328
supra.
66. See notes 37-52 and accompanying text supra.
67. 247 Ind. 113, 210 N.E.2d 852 (1965).
68. 337 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1960).
69. See notes 37-52 and accompanying text supra.
70. See p. 328 supra.
4. Length of Hospitalization
The precise issue in Arnett is whether evidence of length of
hospitalization should be admitted as being relevant to an intent
to kill, yet the Arnett court did not discuss any cases where the
admissibility of length of hospitalization evidence was at issue. The
probable reasons for the lack of reference to length of hospitaliza-
tion cases are three-fold. First, Arnett was a case of first impres-
sion in Indiana and the court probably preferred to make an anal-
ogy to an Indiana case on prognosis rather than to rely on outside
sources. It has already been discussed that the comparison between
prognosis and length of hospitalization is invalid. Second, if the
Arnett court did consider using other jurisdictions' cases on length
of hospitalization, it may have rejected a reliance on so few cases
for authority. Third, and most probable, it is submitted that, even
if the Arnett court tried to rely on other holdings favoring admit-
ting length of hospitalization evidence, it would have found those
cases distinguishable from its own.
Although Arnett involves evidence concerning hospital trans-
fers made by the victim, the evidence can be distinguished from
Gilmer v. State71 and similar rulings. 72 The Gilmer court deter-
mined that the hospital transfers were made as a direct result of
the nature and extent of the victim's injuries and his need for
better treatment. The Arnett evidence, on the other hand, made
no reference to the nature and extent of Bryant's injuries as re-
lated to the hospital transfers and apparently, although the opinion
does not clarify the point, the length of hospitalization evidence
was introduced at a different time from that concerning his injur-
ies.7 3 It is submitted that a relationship between the nature and
71. 157 Tex. Crim. 109, 246 S.W.2d 639 (1952).
72. See cases cited note 53 supra.
73. The testimony, as reported in the Arnett decision, reads:
'Q. Well, you were taken to a hospital, you awakened up in a
hospital. What hospital was that? A. Welborn. Q. All right,
how long did you remain at Welborn Hospital? A. From that
time until the next Tuesday, I believe. [Objection]. Q. The ques-
tion was, how long were you in the hospital at that time. [Ob-
jection] A. From Wednesday morning, April 26 until the follow-
ing Tuesday, I think it was Monday or Tuesday, I really don't
know, when I went to Marion. Q. Yes. Then what is Marion? A.
V.A. Hospital, at Marion, Illinois. Q. How long did you remain
there? At Marion? A. About two weeks. [Objection] Q. All
right, after the two weeks at Marion V.A. Hospital, were you
hospitalized somewhere after that? [Objection] Q. You may an-
swer the question. A. What was the question? Q. The question
was, what further hospitalization, if any, did you have after the
Marion V.A. Hospital? A. I was transferred from Marion V.A.
Hospital to John Cochran V.A. Hospital in St. Louis. Q. How
long were you there? A. Until the 14th of August, this year. Q.
And were you discharged at that time? A. For a couple of
weeks. Q. All right, then did you go back to any hospital? A.
Yes, sir. Q. And was that because of your condition you had
originally gone for? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where did you go? A. Back
to St. Louis. [Objection] Q. How long were you in the hospital
altogether after the early morning of the 26th of April, this year?
[Objection] A. I exactly don't remember. I know the first time
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
extent of a person's injuries and his length of hospitalization pro-
vides the link necessary for length of hospitalization evidence to
be admissible as tending to prove the defendant's intent to kill.
Therefore, the Arnett court erred in allowing the testimony be-
cause in that case the length of hospitalization was not shown to
be directly related to the nature and extent of Bryant's injuries.
CONCLUSION
In choosing to accept the evidence of length of hospitalization
as tending to prove an intent to kill, the Arnett court ruled that
length of hospitalization was analogous not only to the nature
and extent of injuries but also to prognosis or future condition.
Cases appear to support the court's reliance on nature and extent
of injury but there is a split of authority as to prognosis. Al-
though the Indiana court did not cite them, cases have generally
held in favor of admitting length of hospitalization evidence if the
hospitalization was the direct result of the serious nature of the
injury. This Note has offered that length of hospitalization is
analogous neither to nature and extent of injury nor to prognosis
or future condition. Also, the length of hospitalization testimony
in Arnett was not shown to be related to the nature and extent of
the victim's injuries and is therefore distinguishable from other
length of hospitalization holdings. Finally, rather than allow the
evidence unconditionally, the Arnett court should have adopted a
restrictive rule reflecting the Cohn v. Saida74 desire that the evi-
dence be relevant by a reasonable preponderance of the weight.
Evidence of length of hospitalization should be admitted only when
the length of hospitalization is shown to be a direct result of the
serious nature of the victim's injuries.
ROBERT F. COX, JR.
I was out was the 14th of August. I have been four or five times.'
244 N.E.2d at 913-14 (Ind. 1969) (Text of objections and trial court
rulings omitted).
74. 71 N.H. 558, 53 A. 800' (1902).
